This study examines the interaction between the ownership structure and the intragroup transactions of
Korean chaebols to test tunneling hypothesis. Using the data on the intragroup transactions (sales,
purchases, receivables, and payables) and the intragroup ownership between 1999 and 2009, we derive
three findings. First, the intragroup transactions of firms with large and/or direct ownership by the
controlling family enhances the firms’ performance significantly more than those of firms with small
and/or indirect ownership by the family. Second, firms’ performance improves more if the counterparties
of the intragroup transactions are firms with smaller and/or more indirect ownership by family and also
central and listed companies. Third, public firms with large family ownership gain more in valuation as
the intragroup transactions increases, particularly more when the counterparties are firms with smaller
ownership by the family. The results are consistent with tunneling hypothesis and suggest that intragroup
transactions are important means of tunneling activities by controlling families.
Keywords:
Intragroup transactions, tunneling, family business groups, ownership structure, controlling family
[2015년 제 3차] Tunneling through Intragroup Transactions: Evidence
작성자 : 관리자
조회수 : 1184
게시일 :
2015-08-26